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Natural rates of unemployment are often presented as single points. This paper 
points to analytical reasons why it is more plausible to think of ranges for 
equilibrium unemployment, with hysteresis operating as a equilibrium selection 
process. Empirical estimates of natural rates are usually derived from parameters 
estimated in regression equations. This means that there are statistical reasons for 
there being confidence intervals surrounding natural rate estimates. Some 
estimates of such confidence intervals are presented along with a tentative 
exploration of the explanatory power of hysteresis variables.





















































































































































































Natural rates of unemployment, in analytical models or in empirical estimates, 
tend to be presented as single points. This tends to mask the uncertainty 
surrounding both the models and the estimates. The present paper looks at two 
distinct types of reason why it might be more useful to think in terms of ranges, 
or in terms of intervals, for equilibrium unemployment.
The first consideration is analytical. If the underlying economic analysis allows 
for hysteresis, it is pointed out that the standard definition of the natural rate as
depending on.....  the structural characteristics of labour and commodity
markets.....  (Friedman 1968, p. 8) produces a range o f possible values for
equilibrium unemployment. Within this range, the particular unemployment 
equilibrium that will be realised will be determined by the history of the shocks 
affecting actual unemployment. Not all the shocks matter, as in the unit/zero root 
attempt to characterise "hysteresis" in linear models, only the non-dominated 
extremum values. Nominal as well as real shocks are potentially important, thus 
opening up the issue of whether the monetary neutrality axiom applies to 
equilibrium unemployment. This issue has important implications for 
unemployment policy.
The second type of reason for moving away from the single point characterisation 
of equilibrium unemployment is statistical in nature. Even if the natural rate 
hypothesis is accepted as true, natural rates or NAIRUs cannot be directly 
observed, but instead have to be estimated using statistical techniques. Natural 
rates or NAIRUs are usually estimated as non-linear functions of the parameters 
in regression equations. Uncertainty about parameter values inevitably means 
uncertainty about the derived natural rate or NAIRU estimates. Thus it makes 
sense to think in terms of confidence intervals for natural rate estimates. The size 
of the interval can have important implications for the appropriate stance of 
macroeconomic policy.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I points to some of the reasons why 
analytical models of natural rates have been amended to take "hysteresis" into 
account. The account here follows Amable, Henry, Lordon and Topol (1995) and 
Cross (1995) in pointing out that this literature has confused hysteresis with 
unit/zero roots or persistence. Section II outlines what hysteresis actually implies 
for equilibrium unemployment in terms of equilibrium selection within the 
feasible range. Section 111 deals with the confidence intervals surrounding 
estimates of natural rates or NAIRUs. Following the Führer (1995), King, Stock 
and Watson (1995) and Staiger, Stock and Watson (1996a) work on US data, 
estimates of confidence intervals for natural rates or NAIRUs in Europe and 
elsewhere are presented. Cubic spline or mean shift specifications of natural rates 



























































































favourable light. Finally, Section IV attempts some first tentative steps towards 
assessing the ability of hysteresis variables to explain unemployment.
I. The Natural Rate and Unemployment Persistence
The natural rate hypothesis of Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) initially bred 
two propositions: that management of monetary demand could not engineer
"... an arbitrary unemployment rate other than the natural level without sooner or later 
generating a continuing disequilibrium manifested by rising inflation or mounting deflation... 
and that the actual unemployment rate, though occasionally hit by shocks, is constantly 
homing in on the natural rate" (Phelps 1995 p. 15).
The background was not, as the commonly held wisdom has it, an empirical 
breakdown of the preceding Keynes-Phelps orthodoxy regarding unemployment 
and inflation, which “... was sailing on smooth waters, the object of much 
congratulation, rather like the Titanic prior to its collision with the fateful 
iceberg...”. Instead
“...the iceberg was the neutrality axiom of Lemer and Fellner. What made a collision of 
the Phillips curve with neutrality inevitable was that sooner or later someone - or some 
two - would provide one or micro-macro models of the Phillips curve, and with that 
the difficulty of maintaining that inflation was non-neutral, which the Phillips curve 
implies, would be exposed" (Phelps 1995, p. 17).
If aggregate demand can affect the actual but not the natural rate of 
unemployment, and if the natural rate is a strong attractor for actual 
unemployment, the question of what does determine the natural rate arises.
Determinants of the Natural Rate
Several traditions can be distinguished (see Blanchard 1990, Bean 1994 for 
surveys). In a first the natural rate is treated, by default, as a constant. A second 
sees the natural rate as a function of slowly changing variables such as 
demographic structures. In the Phelps (1968) labour turnover model, for 
example, a faster growth of the labour force leads to a higher natural rate because 
of the rising marginal cost of training. In a third tradition, which has dominated 
the literature on European unemployment, the variables driving the natural rate 
are mainly socio-economic in nature. This approach is based on the idea that 
unemployment serves to reconcile the price-setting behaviour by firms in product 
markets with the wages set or bargained in labour markets (Blanchard 1986). The 




























































































with unemployment benefit arrangements (UB), wage bargaining institutions 
(WB), minimum wages (MW) and employment protection measures (EP) being 
among the socio-economic variables seen as driving the natural rate (Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman 1991). A fourth approach is the structuralist account, based 
on intertemporal general equilibrium interaction between incentive wages in 
labour markets, firm-specific capital in the output markets and a largely 
neoclassical specification of asset markets (Phelps 1994). In this account the 
natural rate is endogenous with regard to real shocks, with real interest rates and 
exchange rates playing important roles in the transmission of the shocks. Among 
the shocks identified as important are the, albeit unintended, fiscal expansion in 
the US in the early 1980s and the hike in the real price of oil in 1979. Other real 
shocks which have been suggested as important in the recent literature are the 
opening up of economies such as China to international trade and shocks to 
technology (see OECD 1994, Pt. 1).
The third approach, focusing on socio-economic variables, has dominated the 
debate on why unemployment has risen in European countries (OECD 1994 for 
example). A typical “battle of the mark-ups” model (Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman, p. 378) is:
p-w = Oo - cciu - a 2(p - pe) - a 3(k - 1) (1)
w-p = p0 - Piu - p2(p - pe) + a 3(k - 1) + z (2)
where p is the price level, w is the money wage rate, u is the unemployment rate, 
pe is the expected price level, k is the capital stock, 1 is the labour force, and all 
variables except u are in logs. Production technique and productivity effects are 
ruled out by the cancelling out of the (k-1) effects on prices and wages, and pe is 
specified as derived from a unit root process for the rate of inflation, so pe = p. 
i + Ap., and p - pe = A2p, where A is the difference operator. Defining the natural 
rate equilibrium as p - pe= A2p = 0 yields:
Oto + P» + z 
a, +p,
(3)
Thus the natural rate of unemployment (u*) is driven by a vector of wage 
pressure variables, z, which includes unemployment benefit arrangements (UB), 
minimum wages (MW), employment protection measures (EP) and wage 
bargaining institutions (WB). Any unexplained increases in price or wage push 
(Oo and p0), or reductions in price or wage responsiveness to unemployment (ot| 





























































































Despite the official policy consensus that labour market reforms focusing on the z 
variables are the way to achieve sustainable reductions in unemployment, it is not 
clear that the z variables can explain the rise in European unemployment rates 
since the 1970s. For many of the European countries there has not been the 
upward shift in the z variables since the 1970s to match that in unemployment.
Indicators of unemployment benefit (UB) entitlements have risen in some 
countries but fallen in others (OECD 1996, p. 53). The OECD jobs Study 
analysis was that “...cyclical rises in unemployment, and the tendency for 
unemployment to persist in recovery periods, were often greater in countries with 
high benefit entitlements...” and that “...increases in unemployment which are 
due initially to a macroeconomic shock persist when benefits are high” (OECD 
1994, Pt.II, p. 178). Thus the argument is not so much that UB entitlements have 
served to raise natural rates as that they have increased the persistence in the 
deviations of actual from equilibrium rates of unemployment.
If the assumption of competitive labour markets is dropped, the direction of the 
effects of minimum wage (MW) changes on u* becomes ambiguous. The 
conclusion of a recent survey of the evidence was that
“...in most European countries, there has been little change in minimum wages relative 
to average earnings in the last 30 years ...it is hard to argue that the minimum wage has 
played a large part in the rise in European unemployment during this period” (Dolado, 
Kramarz, Machin , Manning, Margolis and Teulings 1996, p. 357).
Similar theoretical and evidential ambiguity surrounds the effects of some of the 
other z variables. Employment protection (EP) measures, for example, can tend 
to reduce both flows into, and flows out of, unemployment (OECD 1996, p. 45). 
And as far as wage bargaining (WB) institutions are concerned, unionisation 
rates fell in virtually all OECD countries, except the Nordic countries, in the 
1980s (OECD 1994, Pt. 11, p. 10), and it was “difficult to detect beneficial 
effects of centralisation or coordination in pooled cross section time series 
studies on wage equations" (OECD 1994, Pt. II, p. 20).
The UK Case
Labour market reforms along the lines recommended for continental Europe have 
been actively pursued in the UK since 1979. If the "z" explanation of 
unemployment was correct, the UK should have experienced a fall in its natural 




























































































accumulating evidence that in countries which have been active in pursuing 
labour market reform, such as the United Kingdom and New Zealand, structural 
unemployment rates have fallen” (OECD 1996, p. 56). This is not self-apparent.
Many of the ambiguities or uncertainties surrounding the influence of individual z 
variables on unemployment in continental Europe also apply to the UK (see 
Cromb 1993 for a survey). Cointegration tests have failed to identify vectors of z 
variables that cointegrate with UK unemployment (Darby and Wren-Lewis 
1993). In 1979 UK unemployment stood at 5% on OECD definitions. At the end 
of 1996 unemployment remained substantially higher, at 8%, despite the labour 
market reforms in the intervening period. If the “z” explanation is correct UK 
unemployment should be able to fall substantially, say to a natural rate of 2-4%, 
without igniting a rise in inflation. Some commentators argue that this could be 
done, but this remains to be tested. At best the failure of UK unemployment to 
fall below the status quo ante the labour market reforms casts doubt on the 
strong attractor component of the natural rate hypothesis.
Blurring the Dichotomy
Not all academic economists have been convinced by the natural rate hypothesis:
“...the way in which modem macroeconomists toss around the notion of a “natural rate 
of unemployment or employment” is a sort of intellectual scandal ...the coarseness of 
the definition and the weakness of the empirical results... suggest that we are in the 
presence of something that is believed for extra-scientific reasons" (Solow 1987b, 
p. 183).
At the policy level, the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer 1983-89 was
“...extremely suspicious of analysis in terms of... equilibrium unemployment rates ... 
they are in practice extremely nebulous magnitudes, and estimates are contradictory 
and subject to huge variations, even when made by the same economist... since we do 
not have much idea of what the NAIRU is, 1 do not find it a helpful concept...” 
(Lawson 1992, pp. 230, 435).
One of the key areas of concern has been the strong dichotomy between the 
actual and equilibrium rates of unemployment implied by the natural rate 
hypothesis. If the determinants of the natural rate, such as the z variables, had 
been able to explain the upward shifts in European unemployment rates in the 
1980s and 1990s this dichotomy could have been maintained. The fact that actual 
unemployment rates have remained higher than plausible estimates of natural 
rates for protracted periods without the accompaniment of falling inflation, 




























































































shocks affecting actual unemployment to influence the natural rate or NAIRU 
over some “short term”. This means, at least in some short term, that actual 
unemployment can serve as an attractor for equilibrium unemployment.
'The image of unemployment given... was one of aggregate demand-driven 
fluctuations in actual unemployment around an equilibrium that itself moved in 
response to movements in z... this dichotomy... did not fit the experience of the 1980s, 
in which a sharp, aggregate demand-induced increase in unemployment had been 
followed by an increase in equilibrium unemployment... this dichotomy had to be 
abandoned for progress to be made” (Blanchard 1990, p.72).
The reasons for suspecting that shocks to actual unemployment may influence 
equilibrium unemployment are usually described as relating to the presence of 
“hysteresis”. The effects of shocks to actual unemployment or output on 
“structural characteristics” such as the balance of insiders and outsiders in the 
labour force (e.g. Blanchard and Summers 1988), long-term unemployment (e.g. 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991) or stocks of physical capital (eg. Blanchard 
1990) are some of the sources of "hysteresis" that have been investigated. In this 
literature "hysteresis" takes two distinct forms. The first is persistence, in which 
the natural rate hypothesis is retained as a long-run attractor, but supplemented 
by a short-run natural rate or NAIRU which is affected by shocks to actual 
unemployment. In the second zero/unit root case the natural rate hypothesis no 
longer applies, the equilibrium rate of unemployment instead evolving in 
response to all of the shocks, real or nominal, affecting actual unemployment.
“Hysteresis” as Persistence
In one well-known account “hysteresis” effects arise because increases in actual 
unemployment tend to be associated with a fall in the rate of outflow from 
unemployment. This, unless special provision is made once an unemployment 
spell reaches a critical length, leads to more people experiencing long spells of 
unemployment, say longer than a year. The long- term unemployed are seen as 
experiencing an actual or perceived decline in productivity, or propensity to 
search for work, and can become, in effect, disenfranchised from competing for 
job vacancies. This change in the ’’’structural” characteristics of the unemployed 
will in general depend on the dynamics of actual unemployment. In simplified 
form this effect can be captured by adding Au terms to the price and wage 
equations (1) and (2) above (see Nickell 1987 and Layard and Nickell 1987). In 
other words Au > 0 is accompanied by higher long-term unemployment, and less 
downward pressure on prices or wages for any given level of unemployment; and 





























































































w-p = p0- Piu- PnAu - P2(p-pe) + z + a 3(k-l)
Imposing the p - pc = A2p = 0 condition, but not Au=0, yields:
(ai + P i)u *  + (a.i +Pn)u-i
us * = ------------------ ----------- -----




Thus the short-run natural rate us* depends on u*, and hence on z, but also on 
the previous period's actual unemployment u.j. The difference equation for actual 
unemployment underlying (6) is:
ut = A+Bu,.i+CZ,-De, (7)
where A = (oto+PoXoci+an+Pi+Pn)'1
B = (an+PnXoq+an+Pi+Pii)'1 
C = (a i+ an+ p i+ p ii)1 
D = (a2+p2)(ai+an+Pi+Pii)1 
and e = p-pe=A2p
The particular integral of (7) defined by the natural condition p-pe = A2p = 0 is:
A 4- CZi GCo 4- Po 4- Z 
1 -B  “  a. 4-pi
(8)
Thus convergence onto the long-run natural rate will occur if P < 1. If a, 4- P, > 0 
this condition will be satisfied. This is the case assumed to hold in the Layard- 
Nickell model:
“ ...there is short-term “hysteresis”, in the sense that past events affect the current 
short-run NAIRU - but there is no long-term “hysteresis”: there is a unique long-run 
NAIRU... in the end the unemployment rate always reverts" (Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman 1991. p. 10).
If the level effects of unemployment, a.) and Pi, are small relative to the rate of 
change of unemployment effects, a M and pn , the tendency to converge on the 
natural rate equilibrium will be at best weak (see Alogoskoufis and Smith 1991 
and Manning 1993 for evidence to this effect). In fact a key reason for wide 
confidence intervals for natural rate estimates discussed in Section III of this 




























































































particularly well-determined (Staiger, Stock and Watson 1996a). Over the time 
spans of 30 years or so over which natural rate models are usually estimated 
unemployment tends to appear to be an 1(1) variable. To date the various 
specifications of vectors of z variables tried have failed to identify cointegrating 
vectors for actual unemployment (Darby and Wren-Lewis 1993). It may be that 
the real shocks invoked in the Phelps (1994) approach prove able to supplement 
the z variables and yield cointegration attractors for actual unemployment, but 
this remains to be shown.
Zero/Unit Root “Hysteresis”
The above persistence case is often referred to as “weak hysteresis” in contrast 
to the “full hysteresis” case of zero roots in the underlying linear differential 
equations, or unit roots in the underlying difference equations (Giavazzi and 
Wyplosz 1985 and Wyplosz 1987, for example). Taking the discrete time case, 
the unit root case corresponds to B = 1 in (7) above, which will occur when the 
level effects of unemployment are insignificant, so oq + Pi =0. In this case 
imposing pr = peT yields
uT — Uo + AT + C lzr-i + DXst-i (9)
i=0 i=l
Thus in this unit root case the "equilibrium" rate of unemployment depends on all 
the past shocks to unemployment. Taken literally this means that the memory of 
the system is Methusalehesque and unselective, shocks in the distant past having 
as much impact as more recent shocks, and small shocks having the same effects, 
pro rata, as large shocks. This is implausible. The unit root (or zero unit) case 
also has the property that two shocks of equal size but opposite sign will see 
unemployment return to the status quo ante the shocks. As the next section 





























































































The term hysteresis comes from the Greek "to be late, or come behind". The term 
was first coined for application to scientific explanation by the physicist Ewing 
(1881) to refer to effects (in terms of magnetisation) that remain after the initial 
cause (the application of a magnetising force) is removed. Such effects have 
subsequently been discovered or invoked in relation to a wide array of physical, 
biological and social phenomena. A general account of hysteresis as a systems 
property has been provided in Krasnosel'skii and Pokrovskii (1989). The key 
elements required to produce hysteresis are some form o f non-linearity in the 
way the elements in a system respond to shocks; and heterogeneity in the 
elements and therefore in their responses to shocks.
The key implications of hysteresis are remanence, in that the application and 
reversal of a shock will not be followed by a return to the status quo ante\ and a 
selective memory, in which only the non-dominated extremnum values of shocks 
remain in the memory bank, dominated extremum values being wiped (see Cross 
1993 for a general account of hysteresis).
Standard economic analysis assumes that economic equilibria are homeostatic, in 
that the reversal or removal of a temporary shock will be accompanied by a 
return to the initial equilibrium. The issue of hysteresis raises the question of 
whether this assumption holds in economic systems. Marshall (1890, pp. 425-6) 
thought that this assumption was likely to be violated in actual market processes, 
citing the effects of the shock to the supply of cotton during the American Civil 
War as an example. At a more aggregate level Keynes (1934) answered the 
question “are economic systems self-adjusting?” in the negative. If temporary 
shocks can have permanent effects economic equilibria become characterised by 
heterostasis, there now being a range of possible equilibrium values, with the 
actual equilibrium realised being determined by the temporary shocks 
experienced.
Hysteresis thus involves stronger properties than those conveyed by the use of 
the term to describe persistence or zero/unit roots. In the persistence case the 
natural rate equilibrium is unchanged by shocks affecting actual unemployment, 
whereas hysteresis implies that each new extremum value of the shocks 
experienced will lead to a new unemployment equilibrium. In the zero/unit root 
case all the shocks experienced shape the equilibrium, whereas hysteresis 





























































































In the policy literature the key distinction is usually perceived as being between 
structural and actual unemployment:
" ...economic analysis generally distinguishes between the actual unemployment rate 
prevailing at any time, and the "natural" (or "structural") unemployment rate (OECD 1994 
P t.l, p. 66).
The presence of hysteresis implies that temporary shocks can change the 
structural dynamics which help determine equilibrium unemployment (see 
Amable, Henry, Lordon and Topol 1995). Thus, in contrast to the natural rate 
hypothesis, the shocks associated with the peaks and troughs of actual 
unemployment are themselves part of the process determining equilibrium 
unemployment.
An Illustrative Model
The simplest form of non-linearity in the Krasnosel'skii and Pokrovskii (1989) 
hysteresis analysis is the piecewise linear case analysed in Mayergoyz (1991). 
This framework is well suited to micro foundations based on discontinuous 
adjustment (Cross 1994). The presence of fixed costs of adjustment in the form 
of, for example, the sunk costs associated with investment or market entry (Dixit 
and Pindyck 1994), including entry into export markets (Amable, Henry, Lordon 
and Topol 1994), implies the existence of separate triggers for upward and 
downward adjustment. The following exposition is based on Piscitelli, Grinfield, 
Lamba and Cross (1996), which analyses market entry and exit under sunk costs 
in a Dixit-Pindyck framework.
The market has M potential suppliers. The number of active firms is N. When 
active, that is in the market, each firm produces one unit of output and employs 
one unit of labour. When out of the market firms produce zero output and employ 
zero units of labour. Each firm faces sunk costs of market entry, the ilh firm 
requiring a market price of p > a to induce entry and a price of p < b to induce 
exit. Figure 1 illustrates the two switching points. In the range b < p < a the firm 
will either be active or inactive depending on its previously acquired propensity, 
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Heterogeneity is introduced by allowing the a and b switching points to differ 
between firms:
“...different firms have different technologies or managerial abilities... historical accidents 
may leave different firms with stocks of capital that are differently situated relative to their 
action thresholds... then they will have different action thresholds ...” (Dixit and Pindyck 
1994, p. 421).
Each firm is thus identified by a pair of a and b switching points which define its 
hysteron or hysteresis operator Fab which maps from shocks to prices into output 
and employment.
The market price is specified as:
where x is an aggregate shock, to interest rates or exchange rates for example, 
faced by all firms, and f(q) is the deterministic component of the inverse demand 
function, with q,.i=N,_i/M. The dynamics of (10) turn on how pi+i determines qt+ 
i, which can be written:
In a shockless economy, i.e. where x is constant, it can be shown that every 
initial condition converges to a fixed point or a two-period solution in which q 
swings between two points (Piscitelli, Grinfield, Lamba and Cross 1996, p. 3). 
The interesting question is what happens in an economy with shocks.
Consider the effects of a sequence of aggregate shocks that generates the price 
illustrated in Figure 2. As the price rises to p! firms with a ^ p, enter the market 
and employ labour, as the price falls to p2 firms with b > p2 leave the market and 
cease to employ labour, and so on. The division between active and inactive 
firms is illustrated in Figure 3, which uses the Mayergoyz (1991) half-plane 
diagram in which each firm is represented by its (a, b) switching characteristics. 
The (ao, bo) vertex of the triangle is determined by boundary conditions. The 
distribution of firms within the triangle can be seen as depending, inter alia, on 
the “structural characteristics of labour and commodity markets”, such as the “z” 
variables discussed in Section I of this paper, stressed in the natural rate 
literature. Thus a more favourable set of “z” characteristics would tend to shift 
the (a, b) values south-westwards in the triangle, so yielding higher activity and 






























































































f-*l G-U.E-GT 2 ,
A  S f c ì .u E ìJ c .F' O F  S h o c k s
































































































Ç  I GrU ee" 3
S-mtecAse~ ^ ç a . r iT f . qk] BenugeAj dcru/g 






























































































Referring to Figure 3, the rise in price to pi serves to create a horizontal partition 
between the N, active firms below the pi line, and the (M-Ni) inactive firms 
above the line. The subsequent p2, P3 and p4 shocks then trace out a staircase 
partition between N4 and (M-N4), the coordinates being (pi, p2), (p3, p2) and (p3, 
p4). This illustrates the memory property of systems with hysteresis: only the 
extremum values of the shocks experienced count. The wiping-out property can 
be seen by considering the effect of the rise in price to p5, illustrated in Figure 2. 
This dominates the previous local maximum price at p3 and so wipes the effect of 
this dominated extremum value from the memory bank. Thus the coordinates of 
the staircase partition between N and (M-N), (p3, p2) and (p3, p4) are removed 
from the memory. This leaves the new staircase partition between the unhatched 
area in figure 3, N5, and the hatched area, (M-N5). Thus the memory of systems 
with hysteresis is selective: only the non-dominated extremum values of the 
shocks experienced retain an effect.
The contrast with the unit root characterisation of the memory properties of time 
series is interesting. Unit root tests characterise time series as short or long in 
memory depending on whether the root is closer to zero or unity, the extreme 
unit root case implying an infmitely-long memory. With hysteresis the memory is 
derivative of the pattern of shocks. If the major expansionary and contractionary 
shocks have occurred recently the memory will be short, the previous shocks 
having been dominated and therefore eliminated from the memory. Otherwise 
undominated major shocks from the more distant past can impart a long memory.
Figure 4 reproduces the results of simulating the model in (10) and (11), with the 
aggregate demand shock x and the distributions of a and b switching values being 
specified by random number generators (Piscitelli, Crinfield, Lamba and Cross 
1996). The non-stochastic component of the inverse demand function was 
specified as f(qt) = a(Pq, + l)'1, with the a  intercept being set at 0.8 and the p 
slope parameter at 1.4, and 1,200 iterations were used. In response to the price 
fluctuations indicated by the dark line the proportion of active firms N/M follows 
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Ranges for Equilibrium Unemployment
It is, of course, a major step to move from the simple model of hysteresis above 
to the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The model, however, does offer some 
guidelines. The “structural characteristics of labour and commodity markets” or 
“z” variables stressed in the natural rate literature can be seen as affecting the (a, 
b) values of firms. Thus a more favourable set of z characteristics would tend to 
reduce the a and b values of firms , making firms more likely to be active and 
employing labour for any given sequence of aggregate shocks, thus reducing the 
rate of inactivity or “unemployment” (M-N)/M. The innovation is that the 
sequence of shocks experienced, in the form of the non-dominated extremum 
values, also shapes the rate of inactivity or unemployment. The implication is 
that, for any given set of “z” characteristics, there will be a range of feasible 
equilibrium unemployment rates. Each new extremum value of the shocks will, 
by changing the partition between active and inactive firms, change the 
equilibrium unemployment rate.
The inflation-unemployment interaction suggested by this hysteretic equilibrium 
can be written as:
Equation (12) follows the natural rate hypothesis except in specifying the 
equilibrium as hysteresis-haunted; equation (13) is standard in saying that actual 
unemployment depends on the contemporary value of the aggregate shock x as 
well as on the z variables; and equation (14) specifies the hysteresis equilibrium 
for unemployment, uh*, as depending on a hysteresis index of the past non- 
dominated extremum values of the shocks h(x), as well as on z.
To illustrate how this system works consider the sequence of aggregate shocks, 
to interest rates or exchange rates say, illustrated in Figure 5. Whether or not a 
particular interest rate or exchange rate is expansionary or contractionary 
depends on z. The horizontal line on the diagram is thus conditioned on a 
particular value of z, z . A less favourable set of z characteristics, z+, would shift 
the horizontal line upwards, making any given interest rate or exchange rate more 
contractionary or less expansionary; and vice-versa for a more favourable shift in 
z characteristics to z'.
p. — pf = A3p, = F[ui -  uh'] 
u, = g[z,,x,] 































































































Figure 6 illustrates the implications for unemployment and inflation of the shocks 
given in Figure 5. The contractionary shock reaching a trough in period 2 sees 
unemployment rise from 1 to 2. The actual is above the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment, so the rate of inflation falls. As the contractionary shock fades in 
the face of real balance effects, the system does not retrace its steps back to the 
original equilibrium, as the natural rate hypothesis would imply, but instead 
reverts to a higher equilibrium unemployment rate in period 3: the extremum 
value of the shock experienced in period 2 remains in the memory bank. The 
expansionary shock in period 4 sees unemployment fall below the equilibrium 
rate, the rate of inflation rises, which stimulates adverse real balance effects. 
Unemployment rises to a new equilibrium rate in period 5, which is lower than 
the preceding equilibrium rate because the period 4 shock is retained in the 
memory bank. And so on. Take this economy through a further sequence of 
shocks and a range of equilibrium unemployment rates is traced, corresponding 
to the intersections with the vertical axis.
The position of the vertical axis itself in Figure 6 is conditioned on a particular 
value of z, z. . If the z characteristics move favourably to z the equilibrium rates 
of unemployment would be lower for any given x shocks, and vice-versa if there 
are unfavourable developments to z+.
Thus in an economy exposed to shocks there is a range of possible values for 
equilibrium unemployment. Rather than leaving the equilibrum indeterminate, the 
hysteresis hypothesis specifies the specific sub-set of the values of the shocks 
that determine the realised equilibrium. The “z” variables invoked by the natural 
rate hypothesis are also included, and would be the sole determinants of 
equilibrium unemployment in a shockless economy. The implications for policy 
in a world of shocks, however, are substantially different, macro policy measures 
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III. Some Confidence Intervals
The propensity of different models to yield different estimates of natural rates or 
NAIRUs is reasonably well known. For the UK 1988-90, for example, the 
NAIRU estimates ranged from 3.5% to 8.1%, compared to actual unemployment, 
on a claimant definition, of 6.8% (Cromb 1993). Some of the differences arise 
from different specifications of the “z” variables, or of their quantitative impact. 
Another difference is that between “structural” estimates of NAIRUs. derived 
from the z variables, and “reduced-form” estimates based on equations such as:
u* = u + aiA2p+a2Au-a3tb (15)
where tb is the trade balance (Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991).
A source of uncertainty that is less well documented, however, is that arising 
within any given model of the natural rate or NAIRU. A natural rate estimate 
based on a “battle of the mark ups” model, such as in equations (1) - (3) above, 
is derived from point estimates of coefficients in regression equations. The point 
estimates of the coefficients are, of course, subject to confidence intervals, so 
this source of uncertainty will be transmitted to the natural rate estimate. The 
natural rate often appears as a ratio of regression coefficients, so the confidence 
interval surrounding the derived natural rate estimate cannot be immediately 
deduced from the diagnostic test statistics usually reported.
In the recent literature Führer (1995) and Staiger , Stock and Watson (1996a) 
estimated confidence intervals for natural rates or NAIRUs in the US. Two 
methods have been used. Führer (1995) used the “delta” method , which is a 
general approach to constructing standard errors for non-linear functions of 
parameters. A Taylor series expansion is used to provide a linear approximation 
to the underlying non-linear function, on the basis that the linear approximation 
will be asymptotically normally distributed. Staiger, Stock and Watson (1996a) 
found in Monte Carlo simulations, however that the finite sample distributions of 
estimated NAIRUs were non-normal. The NAIRU is often estimated as a ratio of 
coefficients, and distributions of ratios of random variables are usually non­
normal, bi-modal for example. Thus there seem to be good reasons for following 
Staiger, Stock and Watson (1996a) in using “Fieller's method” for estimating 
confidence intervals, even though this procedure is very expensive in terms of 
computer time.
The intuition under the “Fieller method” can be explained by considering the 




























































































(16)A2p, = Eyi(u,-i - u * ) + e ,i*l
Where A2p, is the change in the rate of inflation, u is actual unemployment, u* is 
a fixed natural rate and e is an error term. A more general specification would 
add control variables and lagged dependent variables to the right-hand side of 
(16). Estimation of a confidence interval for u* is non-standard because u* enters 
non-linearly as - l y u  *. For this reason it is more straightforward to estimate:
A2p, = u + lYiU,-i +6,i*l (17)
where u = -  E Y.u *. From (17) the natural rate can be estimated as u * = ——
EY'
i=1
using OLS estimates. To construct a confidence interval around this u* estimate 
the “Fieller method” employs a trial-and-error procedure. The 95% confidence 
interval around both sides of u* is the set of u* values that cannot be rejected as 
true using a 5% hypothesis test. This set is constructed by selection of trial values 
of u*. So a trial value of u*=8%, for example, is selected and (17) is estimated 
using ( u t_j -  8%) rather than u M  as regressors. If u*=8% is true, the value of the 
intercept in (17) would be zero, so the hypothesis u*=8% is tested indirectly by 
testing for u =0 in:
A2p, = u + EY (u'-i - u ' )  + €, (18)
i=l i V '
This procedure is then repeated for all possible values of u*, the 95% confidence 
interval then being defined as the set of u* values that yield intercept estimates 




























































































Specifying the Natural Rate
Staiger, Stock and Watson used a variety of specifications of the US natural rate. 
A distinction can be drawn between statistical specifications for ut* and 
economic theory specifications, such as those using the “z” variables discussed 
in Section I of this paper. To date we have generated results for two of the 
statistical specifications: (i) a constant natural rate, and (ii) a cubic spline 
representation.
The (i) constant u* specification is self-explanatory. In the (ii) cubic spline 
specification u,*=f(St) where S, is specified as a cubic function with two 
equidistant knot points. Details of the econometric specifications are as given in 
Staiger, Stock and Watson (1996a).
The data set used is for quarterly unemployment rates and CPI inflation in 
selected OECD countries for 1960:1-1995:3 taken from the OECD Business 
Sector Database and Main Economic Indicators. The procedure was to replicate 
the Staiger, Stock and Watson estimates for the US, and then generate results for 
other OECD countries. The rate of inflation Ap, was defined as the four-quarter 
change in consumer prices, and the unemployment rates u, are based on the 
OECD definition. The following abbreviations identify the countries concerned: 
USA - United States of America; CAN - Canada; JPN - Japan; DEU - West 
Germany; FRA - France; ITA - Italy; GBR - United Kingdom; IRE - Ireland; 
ESP - Spain; AUT - Austria; SWE - Sweden; AUS - Australia; and NZL - New 
Zealand.
Constant Natural Rates
Chart 1 graphs the unemployment rates and constant NAIRUs estimated for the 
various countries, and Chart 2 gives a scatter plot between A2pt and the implied 
(u,.| -u*) deviations, it is reasonably clear that a constant NAIRU is not a very 
plausible hypothesis for the countries in question, with the possible exception of 
the US. The visual impression is confirmed by the confidence intervals reported 
in Table 1. The 95 % confidence interval for the US natural rate of 4.424 % - 
8.120% is in line with the Staiger, Stock and Watson results. For the selection of 
other countries reported, however, the 95% intervals he outside the possible 
range for unemployment. The 80% confidence intervals reported indicate that, 
even at this confidence level, the size of the NAIRU intervals is indeed large. 
The underlying reason for such large intervals is reflected in the coefficient on 
lagged unemployment, yi, which is not particularly well determined, even in the 




























































































Chart 3 graphs the cubic splines for the natural rate estimated for the various 
countries. The splines were structured as having two equidistant knots, with the 
other dimensions data determined. The visual impression is that the splines are 
somewhat more plausible than the constant natural rate specifications. Chart 4 
graphs A2p, against the (u,-i -  ui i) terms implied by the splines. For some of the
countries the negative correlation expected between A2p, and (u .-i-u '-i) is 
apparent, but the visual impression is that there are a wide range of intercepts for 
A2p, = 0 that are consistent with the data. This visual impression is confirmed by 
the 95% confidence intervals for a selection of countries reported in Chart 5 and 
Table 2. To allow for the fact that the spline will not be well defined at the end 
points of the sample period, the NAIRUs and associated confidence intervals 
reported in Table 2 are for 1990:1.
Discussion
As suggested in Section I of this paper, it is not clear that the “z” variables 
usually invoked by the natural rate hypothesis are able to explain the sustained 
upward shifts in unemployment experienced in many European countries and 
elsewhere since the 1970s. Statistical representations, such as the cubic splines 
reported earlier, are able to mimic at least some of the putative upward shifts in 
natural rates of unemployment, but beg the question of whether the variables of 
the z type stressed in the natural rate hypothesis have been the driving force. 
Arguably, statistical representations such as splines present the natural rate 
hypothesis in a favourable light.
Despite this, the confidence intervals for the natural rates or NAlRUs implied by 
the statistical representations are quite wide. Thus arguments such as that 
macroeconomic policy needs to be restrictive because unemployment is below 
the natural rate need to be treated with a degree of caution. Even if the natural 
rate hypothesis is taken to be true, within the confines of any specific model there 
is a large degree of uncertainty as to what the natural rate actually is.
Cubic Spline Natural Rates
IV. Some Hysteresis Indines
Given the various uncertainties surrounding the natural rate hypothesis and 
estimates of natural rates, it is worth investigating alternative hypotheses, such as 
that of hysteresis in equilibrium unemployment. The analytical properties of 




























































































well known, but empirical applications to economic time series are still in the 
early stages of development.
Some of the steps required to produce estimates of hysteresis-haunted 
equilibrium rates of unemployment can be illustrated by referring to Figure 3 
above, in which the equilibrium unemployment rate uh* is approximated by (M- 
N)/M. To estimate uh* in this framework requires calculation of the area below 
or above the staircase partition between active firms, N, and inactive firms, (M- 
N).
Step 1: this requires specifying the boundary conditions (ao, bo) which determine 
the size of the right-angled triangle for M in Figure 3. In applications to physical 
systems the boundary conditions often correspond to obvious physical limits, 
such as magnetic saturation (Mayergoyz 1991). In economic systems the 
boundary conditions are less obvious. In Chart 6 the boundary points were 
determined as the global maximum and minimum values taken by unemployment 
over the sample period. More generally the boundary conditions would be 
estimated as free parameters.
Step 2: this involves specifying the distribution of the (a, b) switching points 
within Figure 3 , that is the Preisach function (Mayergoyz 1991). In Chart 6 it is 
assumed that the (a, b) switching points are uniformly distributed. Ideally the (a, 
b) distributions would be specified on the basis of cross-sectional evidence , or at 
least allowed to vary with the “z” structural characteristics, as discussed in 
Section II.
Step 3: this involves identifying shock variables to determine the vertices of the 
staircase partition in Figure 3. Experiments with time series for real exchange 
rates and real interest rates have generated hysteresis indices, h(x), for these x 
shocks that are, by and large, plausible (Piscitelli 1997). To date, however, the 
h(x) results are not available for the 1960- 1995 period. Chart 6 reports time 
series for h(u), that is hysteresis indices for actual unemployment. This begs the 
questions of how the h(x) variables shape h(u).
Step 4: the final step involves writing a programme for the hysteresis indices, 
h(x) and h(u), which is presented in Piscitelli (1997).
Chart 6 graphs the h(u) indices generated for the US, UK, Germany, France, Italy 
and Japan, along with the time series for actual unemployment rates, u. The 
broad pattern of the h(u) indices is not implausible, but this represents no more 
than a preliminary and tentative first step towards investigating the explanatory 
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TABLE 1 : CONFIDENCE INTERVALS AROUND CONSTANT NAIRUs
Coefficient on U,.i 
and t-statistic
NAIRU 80% confidence 
interval
95% confidence 1 
interval








2.3051 cannot be 
calculated




4.9784 cannot be 
calculated






















(i) A2p, = P Q +  +  £  P A lp,_i +% y2A ut-i+ e i estimated by OLS; u =
/=! (=1 Po
(ii) Sample: 1962Q2 to 1995Q3 for all countries except France (1965Q1 to 1995Q1)
(iii) Data Sources:
Unemployment rates - OECD Business Sector Database 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 2: CONFIDENCE INTERVALS AROUND SPLINE NAIRUs
A c t u a l NAIRU 1990.1 80% 95%
U n e m p l o y m e n t C o n f id e n c e C o n f id e n c e
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